C O M M E N T

Jurisdiction and Applicable Law Under UNCLOS introduction
In the recent case of Chagos Marine Protected Area, 1 a five-member tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-CLOS) 2 held in its hands the fate of the Chagos Archipelago. One of the questions before the tribunal was whether it had the jurisdiction to declare that the British occupation of the Chagos Archipelago and the forcible removal of the Archipelago's indigenous population violated the fundamental right to selfdetermination. The answer hinged on a technical, procedural point: Does the applicable law provision of UNCLOS, Article 293(1), expand the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals? 3 The law was not on the side of the Chagossians. It is a well-established principle of international law that applicable law provisions do not expand the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals. 4 So after Mauritius impliedly 
2.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
3.
For the purposes of this Comment, an "UNCLOS tribunal" is any court or tribunal that exercises jurisdiction by virtue of UNCLOS. See id. art. 287(1); infra text accompanying note 23.
asserted that Article 293(1) could expand the jurisdiction of the tribunal, 5 the United Kingdom-the other party to the dispute-quickly refuted the assertion, noting that " [t] his is an old debate, and one that, quite frankly, we should not be having." 6 The tribunal ultimately ruled in favor of the United Kingdom on this point. But if the principle is so well-established and the debate so old, why did it receive so much attention in the written and oral stages of the proceedings?
The reason is straightforward but possibly appalling to international lawyers: UNCLOS tribunals have not uniformly conformed to the principle. As of September 2016, UNCLOS tribunals in seven cases have considered whether Article 293(1) can expand their jurisdiction. On the one hand, the tribunals in M/ V Saiga (No. 2) , 7 Guyana v. Suriname, 8 and M/ V Virginia G 9 (the M/ V Saiga line of cases) effectively invoked Article 293(1) to expand their jurisdiction. On the other hand, the tribunals in MOX Plant, 10 Chagos, 11 Arctic Sunrise, 12 and
5.
It should be noted that Mauritius on the surface argued that Article 293 (1) 
i. unclos and article 293(1)
A critical difference between domestic legal systems and the international legal order is that the latter lacks courts with compulsory jurisdiction. 19 One who suffers an injury under domestic law will usually be able to seek relief in a domestic court with jurisdiction over the claim, whereas one who suffers an injury under international law often cannot find a judicial forum with jurisdiction.
The drafters of UNCLOS sought to change this reality with respect to claims concerning the law of the sea. Famously characterized as "a constitution for the oceans," 20 the Convention sets out in 320 articles and nine annexes a comprehensive body of law governing practically all matters relating to the law of the sea, such as maritime delimitation, environmental protection, fisheries management, and marine scientific research. Most importantly for the purposes of this Comment, Part XV of the Convention establishes a dispute settlement mechanism to ensure compliance with the Convention. Two provisions in Part XV are particularly relevant.
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First, the jurisdiction provision, Article 288(1), grants UNCLOS tribunals the jurisdiction to settle UNCLOS claims. 21 Consequently, aside from a few exceptions, 22 any state that suffers an injury under UNCLOS may seek relief from an UNCLOS tribunal. In theory, UNCLOS tribunals may take one of four forms: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), an Annex VII tribunal, or an Annex VIII tribunal. 23 In practice, however, all UNCLOS tribunals have either been ITLOS or an Annex VII tribunal. ITLOS is a permanent judicial body composed of twenty-one judges. 24 By contrast, Annex VII tribunals are ad hoc arbitral tribunals normally composed of five arbitrators. 25 Together, ITLOS and Annex VII tribunals have been seized of twenty-one disputes (excluding prompt release cases) and have reached a decision on the merits in ten of those disputes. 26 Second, the Convention's applicable law provision, Article 293(1), provides that UNCLOS tribunals "shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention."
27 Some have interpreted Article 293(1) to expand the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals to include certain non-UNCLOS claims. Under this interpretation, Article 293(1) would grant UN-CLOS tribunals the jurisdiction to declare whether states have violated certain non-UNCLOS rules of international law, such as the rules on the use of force, the rules on the acquisition of territory, and the rules of international human rights law. This interpretation, however, is incorrect.
A
proper interpretation of Article 293(1) requires recourse to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
28 Article 31 is universal-21. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 288(1). For the purposes of this Comment, an "UNCLOS claim" is any claim "concerning the interpretation or application of [UNCLOS]." Id.
22. See id. pt. XV, § 3.
23.
Id. art. 287. Technically, the ICJ is a "court" rather than a "tribunal," but this distinction is immaterial here because the ICJ has never exercised jurisdiction by virtue of Article 288(1).
24.
Id. annex VI, art. 2(1).
25.
Id. annex VII, art. 3. 27. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 293(1) (emphasis added). ly considered to reflect customary international law, 29 and scholars agree that international courts and tribunals must apply the Article when interpreting treaties.
30 Article 31 provides: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." 31 In other words, one must examine three items: the ordinary meaning of the text, the context, and the object and purpose of the treaty.
First, the ordinary meaning of the text of Article 293(1) conveys the notion that it does not expand the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals. In fact, the very wording of the provision reveals that it only speaks to applicable law, not jurisdiction. Article 293(1) states: "A court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention."
32 It therefore envisages a two-step process: first, the UNCLOS tribunal must determine whether it has jurisdiction (under Article 288); second, if it has jurisdiction (and only if it has jurisdiction), then the tribunal shall apply UNCLOS and "other rules of international law." Given that Article 288(1) grants UNCLOS tribunals jurisdiction only over UNCLOS claims, 33 the "other rules of international law" should be interpreted as referring primarily to rules of international law that help UNCLOS tribunals exercise their jurisdiction over UNCLOS claims. Second, the context of Article 293(1) affirms this interpretation. The official title of Article 288 is "Jurisdiction" and that of Article 293 is "Applicable Law," reinforcing the fact that the Convention considers them to be two separate notions. One cannot use the applicable law provision (Article 293) to expand jurisdiction; otherwise, it would violate the jurisdiction provision (Article 288).
Third, the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as expressed in the Preamble, is to govern "all issues relating to the law of the sea."
35 It is not intended to govern issues outside the law of the sea. Consequently, it makes sense that Article 293(1) cannot expand the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals beyond their jurisdiction under Article 288(1) to resolve UNCLOS claims.
Therefore, Article 293(1) should not be interpreted as an expansion of the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals beyond UNCLOS.
ii. cases exercising jurisdiction
Despite this seemingly straightforward analysis, UNCLOS tribunals have invoked Article 293(1) to expand their jurisdiction to non-UNCLOS claims in three cases. The first was ITLOS's second case: M/ V Saiga (No. 2). In 1997, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (St. Vincent) instituted an UNCLOS arbitration against Guinea claiming, inter alia, that Guinea had violated the prohibition on the use of excessive force in the detention of ships when Guinean authorities arrested a ship registered in St. Vincent. 36 Although the prohibition is an established norm of customary international law, 37 it is not explicitly enshrined in UNCLOS. 38 The most pertinent provision concerning the use of force in UNCLOS is Article 301, but this provision prohibits only the threat or use of force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." 39 ITLOS therefore con-UNCLOS; (3) secondary rules of general international law (e.g., treaty law, state responsibility, and diplomatic protection); and (4) rules to help interpret UNCLOS under Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. cluded that UNCLOS does not expressly regulate the use of force in the arrest of ships. 40 As a result, St. Vincent's claim that Guinea violated the prohibition on the use of excessive force in the detention of ships could not constitute a claim under Article 301, but rather constituted a non-UNCLOS claim based on customary international law. ITLOS, however, held:
Although the Convention does not contain express provisions on the use of force in the arrest of ships, international law, which is applicable by virtue of article 293 of the Convention, requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international law.
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According to the language above, ITLOS only relied on Article 293(1) to "apply" the prohibition on the use of excessive force, without making an express claim of jurisdiction. However, ITLOS ultimately made a formal determination that Guinea violated the prohibition, 42 which ipso facto amounted to an exercise of jurisdiction over the claim. 43 Remarkably, ITLOS did not provide any justification beyond the paragraph quoted above for this exercise of jurisdiction.
Then in 2004, in the case of Guyana v. Suriname, Guyana instituted proceedings against Suriname before an Annex VII tribunal claiming, inter alia, that Suriname was "internationally responsible for violating . . . the Charter of the United Nations, and general international law . . . because of its use of armed force" against a Canadian vessel licensed by Guyana. 44 Once again, although UNCLOS prohibits the use of force against "the territorial integrity or 60 And in a formal statement released by its president, the tribunal asserted that any non-UNCLOS claims would be inadmissible. 61 In doing so, it did not attempt to reconcile the inconsistency between its holding and ITLOS's judgment in M/ V Saiga (No. 2) .
Then in 2010, in the case of Chagos, Mauritius brought an UNCLOS proceeding against the United Kingdom over the Chagos Marine Protected Area, requesting, inter alia, that the tribunal determine who-Mauritius or the United Kingdom-had sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. 62 As UNCLOS does not contain provisions on territorial sovereignty, 63 Mauritius's claim was a non-UNCLOS claim. Yet Mauritius cited M/ V Saiga (No. 2) and Guyana v. Suriname for the proposition that the tribunal could apply non-UNCLOS rules of international law to resolve the sovereignty claim as long as it was sufficiently connected with an UNCLOS claim. 64 The Annex VII tribunal first clarified that " dress such matters raises a question of the scope of jurisdiction under the Convention." 65 It then found that it did not have jurisdiction over the sovereignty claim.
66 Notably, although it summarized the parties' arguments on Article 293(1), M/ V Saiga (No. 2), and Guyana v. Suriname, 67 the tribunal did not refer to any of them when explaining its decision. 68 The third case that rejected an expansion of jurisdiction under Article 293(1) was Arctic Sunrise. In 2013, the Netherlands instituted UNCLOS proceedings against Russia, seeking, inter alia, a declaration that Russia had violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in its arrest and detention of the Greenpeace activists aboard the MV Arctic Sunrise.
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Since the ICCPR is a separate treaty not codified in UNCLOS, the Annex VII tribunal was confronted with a non-UNCLOS claim. In line with the jurisprudence of the MOX Plant and Chagos tribunals, the Arctic Sunrise tribunal expressly held that "Article 293(1) does not extend the jurisdiction of the tribunal" 70 and "Article 293 is not . . . a means to obtain a determination that some treaty other than the Convention has been violated." 71 In applying this principle to the case before it, the tribunal declared: "This Tribunal does not consider that it has jurisdiction to apply directly provisions such as Articles 9 and 12(2) of the ICCPR or to determine breaches of such provisions." . 2) . The reality is that IT-LOS had not specified any such substantive provision when explaining its exercise of jurisdiction over the use-of-force claim. 74 Second, the tribunal downplayed ITLOS's treatment of the use-of-force claim in M/ V Saiga (No. 2). As discussed above, ITLOS had declared a violation of the prohibition on the use of excessive force, which amounted to an exercise of jurisdiction. The Arctic Sunrise tribunal, however, stated that ITLOS merely "took account" of rules concerning the use of force.
The fourth and final case that rejected an expansion of jurisdiction under Article 293(1) was Duzgit Integrity. In 2013, just a few weeks after the Netherlands filed its claim against Russia, Malta instituted UNCLOS proceedings against São Tomé and Príncipe (São Tomé) over São Tomé's arrest of the Maltese vessel Duzgit Integrity in São Toméan archipelagic waters. 75 Malta argued, inter alia, that São Tomé's arrest, imprisonment, and fining of the master and crew of the vessel violated "generally applicable rules of international law related to fundamental human rights and humanitarian concerns." 76 As UNCLOS does not contain provisions on "human rights and humanitarian concerns," São Tomé argued that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over these non-UNCLOS claims. 77 After considering both Article 288(1) and Article 293(1), the tribunal concluded that "[t]he combined effect of these two provisions is that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine breaches of obligations not having their source in the Convention (including human rights obli- 
